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In the present work we were concerned with the role of sound representations in object
recognition. In order to address this issue we made use of a picture naming task in
which target pictures might be accompanied by a white-noise burst. White-noise was
thought to interfere with the representation of the sound possibly associated with the
depicted object. We reasoned that if such a representation is critical for the recognition
of objects strongly associated with certain sounds, white-noise interference should affect
the naming of pictures representing objects with typical sounds leaving the naming of
object without typical sounds unaffected. The results were congruent with the predictions
and consistent with a view of the semantic representations of objects as collection of
related representations, modal in nature, and mandatorily accessed.
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INTRODUCTION
This study deals with the role of sounds in object recognition in
humans. Indeed, some objects are easily associated with a sound,
i.e., some objects possess either a typical sound or category of
sounds. This is the case, for example, of objects such as “bell” or
“motorbike.” Other objects do not possess typical sounds or can
be associated with particular sounds only with difficulty. This is
the case, for example, of objects such as “table” or “pillow.”
Given that objects can be classified as a function of whether
they possess or not a typical sound, a legitimate question is
whether the typical sounds play any role in the visual recognition
of the related objects. There are at least two opposed scenarios to
frame this question.
In the first scenario, upon the presentation of a visual object
the system first accesses an abstract representation of that object
and then—depending on the task at hand—accesses the repre-
sentations of information related to that object: among these
representations is the representation of the typical sound. Thus,
in this scenario, the access to the typical sound is post-categorical,
in the sense that the object is first recognized as an instance of a
particular kind (e.g., a “dog”) and then the related information is
retrieved (cf. Allport, 1977; Mulatti et al., 2014). Here, the typical
sound may be activated but, since its retrieval follows the identi-
fication of the object, it does not play any role in the recognition
of the object.
In the second scenario, all stored representations associated to
a given object are immediately and mandatorily activated upon
the visual presentation of an instance of that kind of object. Here,
the identification of the object does not consist in the activation of
an abstract semantic representation of this object but instead cor-
responds to the activation of all stored representations. In other
words, object identification is the activation of object knowledge.
For objects with a typical sound, the typical sound is part of
the knowledge of that object and, therefore, the activation of the
typical sound is part of the process of object identification: an
object cannot be identified without its typical sound being acti-
vated. Thus, in this second scenario the access to the typical sound
is pre-categorical and has a functional significance in the iden-
tification process: typical-sound activation does not only occur
when it is requested by the task and it is not simply a concomi-
tant, epiphenomenal, effect of the identification (cf. Kiefer and
Barsalou, 2013).
These two scenarios can be seen as the two extreme positions
of a continuum of scenarios going from post- to pre-categorical,
and therefore intermediate positions are possible (Pezzulo, 2011).
In this study we attempt to provide evidence in favor of one of
these two extremes.
Previous studies investigating cross-modal effects in object
recognition have shown that when both visual and auditory infor-
mation (e.g., the picture of an object and the typical sound of an
object) are presented in object recognition tasks, both types of
information affect the time need to emit a response: responses are
usually faster when participants are presented with cross-modal
congruent stimuli (i.e., the sound refers to the object depicted
in the picture) than when they are presented with incongruent
stimuli (i.e., the sound is typical of another object; e.g., Laurienti
et al., 2003). Based on psychophysiological and neuroimaging
findings, visual and auditory inputs are thought to interact
quite early (i.e., at sensory processing stages; e.g., Giard and
Peronnet, 1999). Yet, according to the most accepted view, they
would be integrated afterwards (e.g., Hocking and Price, 2008),
at higher cognitive processing stages. Sensory information from
unimodal processing channels would converge onto a modality–
independent semantic system (Coltheart, 1987). Cross-modal
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semantic congruency effects would arise at this processing level
and, consistent with this view, they are typically interpreted
within a post-categorical framework (cf., Schneider et al., 2008).
Congruent visual and auditory inputs are seen as independent
perceptual cues activating the same (amodal) semantic knowl-
edge. The addition of a redundant congruent perceptual cue (e.g.,
the typical sound of an object when participants has to recognize
a picture) can facilitate the recognition of the object by enhancing
its activation level (then reducing competition) and is particularly
useful when the object has many structurally and semantically
similar neighbors that compete for selection (Humphreys et al.,
1995). In this respect, a congruent sound does not have any facil-
itatory role in the recognition of an object when recognition can
proceed on the basis of visual stimuli alone (e.g., Hocking and
Price, 2008).
However, results of cross-modal integration studies might be
equally easily interpreted by a pre-categorical account assigning
to sounds a functional role in visual object recognition. Indeed,
results obtained in tasks providing for the presentation of both
visual and auditory stimuli related to a given object cannot help
to discriminate between the two accounts: results of these stud-
ies tell us nothing about whether the typical sound of an object
is activated even when only the visual form of this object is pre-
sented, nor whether the sound activation, possibly triggered by
the mere presentation of visual stimuli (e.g., Nyberg et al., 2000),
is simply a byproduct of object recognition processes or is critical
for, and inextricable from, such processes.
The cross-modal semantic congruency paradigm does not
then seem a suitable tool for the investigation of the possible
functional role of typical sounds in visual object recognition. In
the experiment presented below, participants are administered a
visual object recognition task in which the activation of the object
typical sound is neither required nor triggered by redundant audi-
tory stimuli: we do not present the typical sound of an object or
cues that can somehow evoke such a sound, but rather present
stimuli that should interfere with the possible (unrequested) acti-
vation of the typical sound induced by the recognition process
itself.
In this experiment, participants perform a picture naming
task. Our choice of the task fell on picture naming because of
two aspects that characterize it. First, picture naming requires
access to the semantic system (e.g., Potter and Faulconer, 1975;
Mulatti et al., 2010). Second, picture naming does not stress the
processing of any particular aspect of the meaning in order to be
performed, that is it does not require the retrieval of any par-
ticular feature of the meaning (Dell’Acqua et al., 2010; Mulatti
and Coltheart, 2012): in the present context this means that the
naming of a picture of an object possessing a typical sound does
not mandatorily require the activation of sound-related repre-
sentations. So, if an effect due to the typical sound were found
in picture naming, we could reasonably conclude that the repre-
sentation of the typical sound is mandatorily activated in object
recognition because of the architecture of the semantic system
and not because of the requirements of the task.
In the study, participants name pictures depicting two kinds
of objects, objects possessing typical sounds and objects not pos-
sessing typical sounds. Here, possessing or not a typical sound is
an operational construct that should not be interpreted literally.
An object possesses a typical sound if a sound can be easily asso-
ciated to that object. An object does not possess a typical sound if
no sound can be easily associated to that object.
Each picture is presented twice to each participant, once in
each of two conditions. In one condition, the picture is presented
along (SOA = 0) with a brief (400ms) white-noise sound. In
the other condition, the picture is presented in isolation, i.e., not
accompanied by any sound. White noise should interfere with
the retrieval of typical sounds. This is supported by the results of
previous studies suggesting the existence of a close link between
auditory perception and auditory imagery and memory (e.g., the
neural structures active in auditory perception are also active in
auditory imagery; see Hubbard, 2010, for a review) and showing
that auditory distraction may selectively impair recall of auditory
information (e.g., Vredeveldt et al., 2011).
This manipulation then allows us to investigate the possible
involvement of typical sound activation in the recognition of
the objects depicted in the pictures. If the access to the typical
sound is post-categorical, then the concurrent presentation of
white noise should not affect the naming of objects with a typical
soundmore than the naming of objects without a typical sound—
and both should not differ from naming the same objects when
presented in isolation, i.e., without white noise. This is because
picture naming rests on the identification of the object stimulus,
and, according to the post-categorical view, the identification of
a visual object stimulus precedes—and is independent from—the
activation of the representation of the typical sound. So, even if
the presence of white-noise affects representation of the sound
typically associated with the presented object, this would not
affect object naming, regardless of whether the object possesses
a typical sound or not.
Instead, if the access to the typical sound is pre-categorical,
then the presence of white-noise should interfere more with
the naming of objects possessing a typical sounds compared to
objects not possessing typical sounds—with respect to the control
condition. In the pre-categorical scenario, the activation of the
typical sound representation is part of the process of object identi-
fication, for those objects that possess a typical sound. Therefore,
if the presence of white-noise interferes with the activation of
the representation of the typical sound, it also interferes with the
identification of the object. Given that object naming rests on
object identification, the presence of white-noise should interfere
with object naming, but only in the case that the to-be-named
object possesses a typical sound.
EXPERIMENT
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-two students of the Università degli Studi di Padova vol-
untarily participated in the experiment. They were all native
Italian speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
none reported auditory impairments. Oral consent was obtained
from each participant before the beginning of the experiment
as required by the regulation of the ethical committee of the
Università degli Studi di Padova regarding behavioral studies
involving adult human participants.
Frontiers in Psychology | Language Sciences October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1139 | 2
Mulatti et al. The sounds of objects in object recognition
Design
A 2 Type Of Object (possessing vs. not-possessing typical
sound) × 2 Presentation Condition (picture accompanied with
white noise vs. alone) within-subject design was used.
Material
128 line-drawing (black on white background) pictures of objects
(half possessing a typical sound and half not possessing a typ-
ical sound) were selected as stimuli. They were taken from the
databases of Bates et al. (2003), and of Dell’Acqua et al. (2000).
Fourteen participants (not involved in the main study) evaluated
how easily each object evocates a typical sound by means of a
7 points Likert-like scale (1 = difficult). In average, objects that
were classified as possessing a typical sound received a score of
6.4 (range 5.3–7; SD = 0.5) whereas objects that were classified as
not possessing a typical sound received a score of 1.7 (range 1–2.6;
SD = 0.5). Stimuli in the two categories were balanced in terms
of frequency of occurrence, name agreement, length, and phono-
logical neighborhood size (ts < |1|). The names of the stimuli are
reported in the Appendix in Supplementary Material.
A digital hissing sound (44.1 kHz, −6 dBFS) of 400ms of
duration was construed and used as the white-noise stimulus.
Apparatus and procedure
The experiment took part in a dim-lit sound attenuated room
equipped with a PC to which a 17 in. CRT monitor, a voice key,
and a pair of speakers were connected. The experiment was con-
trolled by a software developed in E-Prime 2.0. Participants were
tested individually and instructed to name the picture as quickly
and accurately as possible. Each trial started with the presenta-
tion of a fixation point (+) for 500ms. At its off-set a picture
was presented. Reaction times were time-locked to the onset of
the picture. Pictures were presented in a single block and, as a
function of the experimental condition, they presented either in
isolation or accompanied (SOA = 0) by the white-noise sound
which was delivered by the speakers. The order of presentation
of the stimuli for each participants was random. Apparatus and
naming errors were scored manually by the experimenter. Before
the picture naming experiment, participants were familiarized
with the pictures and their names. The experimental session was
preceded by a 20-trials practice session.
RESULTS
Reaction times (RTs)
Apparatus failures (2.2%) and naming errors (2.8%) were
removed prior to RTs analyses. Correct RTs were submitted
to the Van Selst and Jolicoeur (1994) recursive outlier trim-
ming procedure, which excluded an additional 2.4% of the data.
Mean naming latencies according to conditions are reported in
Table 1. In the by-subjects ANOVA (F1), both Type Of Object
(possessing vs. not-possessing typical sound) and Presentation
Condition (picture accompanied with white noise vs. alone)
were treated as within-subjects factors. In the by-items ANOVA
(F2), Type Of Object was treated as a between-items factor
whereas Presentation Condition was treated as a within-items
factor. The analyses showed a significant main effect of Type of
Object in the by-subjects analysis, F1(1, 31) = 6.8, MSE= 3640,
Table 1 | Mean reaction times (RTs) and percentage of errors (E%)
according to conditions.
Typical White noise Differences
sound (RT )
Without With
RT E% RT E%
With 910 2.9 951 2.3 −41
Without 903 3.1 902 2.9 1
p < 0.05, but not in the by-item analysis, F2(1, 126) = 1.4,
MSE = 34061, p = 0.24, a significant main effect of Presentation
Condition, F1(1, 31) = 4.4, MSE = 2342, p < 0.05, F2(1, 126) =
7.5, MSE = 3567, p < 0.01, and, crucially, a significant inter-
action, F1(1, 31) = 4.9, MSE = 2854, p < 0.05, F2(1, 126) = 8.6,
MSE = 3567, p < 0.005. Planned comparisons revealed that
RTs were significantly slower when objects possessing typical
sounds were presented with white-noise with respect to when pre-
sented alone, t-participants(31) = 3.1, p < 0.005, t-items(63) =
3.8, p < 0.001. In contrast, RTs for the objects not possessing
typical sounds were unaffected by the presence of white-noise,
both ts < |1|.
Errors
Mean error percentages are reported in Table 1. No effects were
significant in the analyses of errors, Fs < 1.
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed at assessing the role of sound represen-
tation in object recognition. In order to address this issue we have
exploited a picture naming task in which target pictures might be
accompanied by a white-noise burst. White noise was thought to
interfere with the representation of the sound possibly associated
with the depicted object.We reasoned that if such a representation
is critical for the recognition of objects strongly associated with
certain sounds, white-noise interference should affect the naming
of pictures representing these objects.
The results are clear cut, as a white-noise burst presented
with a to-be-named picture does interfere with picture nam-
ing but only if the picture depicts an object possessing a typical
sound. There are two aspects of this finding that are worth
discussing.
First, in a standard picture naming task participants are only
required to name the stimulus they are presented with as quickly
as possible, they are not required to retrieve particular aspects of
the meaning of the stimulus, as its typical color, smell or sound.
Thus, the finding that the presentation of white noise inter-
feres with picture naming when the stimulus depicts an object
possessing a typical sound suggests that the activation of the audi-
tory representations associated to that object is mandatory upon
stimulus presentation.
Second, the fact that the naming of objects possessing a
typical sound is interfered with by the concurrent presenta-
tion of a white-noise sound-stimulus suggests that the repre-
sentations of sounds are activated while the object is being
identified, that is that object-related sound are activated before
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complete identification of the object had occurred. In other
words, this finding is congruent with a pre-categorical view—
and therefore incongruent with a post-categorical view—of the
access to object-related sound representations, thus suggesting
that object-related sound representations participate in object
identification.
Once established that the pre-categorical scenario is more con-
gruent with the above finding than a post-categorical scenario,
a question naturally arises: why does white-noise interfere? That
is, what is the mechanism that causes this interference? One pos-
sibility is to assume that auditory representations are modal, in
the sense that acquired auditory knowledge is stored (at least
partially) in the same systems that subserve auditory process-
ing (Kiefer et al., 2008; Vermeulen et al., 2008). Thus, upon
the presentation of a visual object possessing a typical sound,
the corresponding modal auditory representation—residing in
the auditory processing system—is activated. If the system stor-
ing auditory knowledge is also the system subserving auditory
processing, then the presentation of an auditory stimulus—e.g.,
white-noise—will interfere with the possible concurrent activa-
tion of auditory representations—e.g., the typical sound of the
object (see Connell and Lynott, 2012, for a discussion), which is
what we observed.
A similar explanation has been proposed by Matheson et al.
(2014) to account for the interference effects they found in a
task requiring the execution of irrelevant movements while par-
ticipants named picture of either animals or inanimate objects.
Matheson et al. observed that the naming of manipulable arti-
facts was affected by concurrent motor activity, whereas no
effects of motor activity were found when participants named
non-manipulable animals. The authors concluded that the same
neural sensorimotor networks are involved in encoding and
retrieving object knowledge (cf. Barsalou, 1999, 2008) and the
concurrent irrelevant motor activities interfered with the acti-
vation of motor programs that were necessary to retrieve object
knowledge.
In conclusion, our finding supports a pre-categorical view
of the semantic of objects and is consistent with a concept of
concepts as collections of mandatorily accessed, related represen-
tations (Redmann et al., 2014) which are modal in nature.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.
01139/abstract
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